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Similar to sex, the Soviet Union did not have corporations. The famous utterance from 
the Gorbachev era about a sexless Soviet existence suggests how we might approach 
what happened to the corporation in Soviet history. Like explicit sex in Soviet culture, 
the workers’ state formally eradicated the dreaded incorporated bodies of capitalism 
and gave them no quarter in subsequent ideological battles. But just like sex, the behav-
iors and practices of corporations kept cropping up in the oddest places to help sustain 
the Soviet economy, while the West remained a source of inspiration for new ways to do 
it. To examine the corporation in the Soviet era, this article explores Aeroflot and the 
routes it shared with Pan American World Airways between the United States and Soviet 
Union in the late 1960s and 1970s. I argue that operating in the US market allowed 
Aeroflot to learn how to become a corporation well before the Gorbachev era and the 
collapse of the USSR. Aeroflot’s adaptations of corporate practices bolstered rather than 
threatened the airline and the Soviet political economy. In addition, I show how the 
airline relied not just on Pan Am but also on a network of American businesses and indi-
viduals, including émigrés from Russia, to acculturate itself to corporate practices. 
What Aeroflot’s example suggests, I argue, is that Soviet enterprises could become cor-
porations in all but name beyond Soviet borders and that their models for doing so were 
not prerevolutionary Russian corporations but Western corporations of the postwar era. 
This article also demonstrates the ways corporations and state socialist enterprises 
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shaped the Cold War, as well as what closer attention to them can reveal about how the 
superpower conflict ended.
Keywords: Aeroflot; Pan Am; Cold War; Commercial Aviation; Advertisements; Corporation
To American aviation experts during the Cold War, Aeroflot was many things, but a 
corporation in any conventional sense it was not. To some, it was an “operation,” 
communist infiltration dressed up to look like an airline. Soon after Aeroflot shocked 
the world in 1956 by introducing its first jet passenger aircraft, the Tupolev TU-104, 
the Air Transport Association of America sounded the alarm with its pamphlet, Red 
Star into the West. Aeroflot’s encroachment in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East 
“would carry the Soviets right into the heart of that part of the world which Ameri-
can diplomacy and military statecraft has [sic] sought hardest to make safe for the 
West. The Soviet turboprop and turbojet transports may turn out to be a greater chal-
lenge to Western aspirations, than Soviet military might could be” (Red Star into the 
West  1958:1; emphasis in the original). Aeroflot’s roles in espionage, stealing avia-
tion technology, serving as a cover for KGB agents, and the 1968 Soviet suppression 
of the Prague Spring drew anxious media attention (Washington Post 1965; Guardian 
1966; New York Times 1967; Anderson 1980; Cemlyn-Jones 1980).1 Even its part in a 
fictitious invasion of the United States in the film Red Dawn was evident to any Amer-
ican teenager. “First wave of the attack came in the disguise of commercial charter 
flights same way they did in Afghanistan.”2
To less alarmist observers, Aeroflot was a sprawling organization with functions 
no other airline undertook. In a 1960 report funded by the Lockheed Aircraft Corpo-
ration, aviation consultant and future head of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) Se-
cor Browne highlighted its special roles in crop dusting, forest management, map-
ping, and nautical navigation.3 Aeroflot contributed to meteorological studies and 
polar exploration, provided airborne ambulances, and advanced aviation through 
“DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy), a 
3,000,000-member paramilitary organization designed to promote interest in flying, 
gliding, parachute-jumping, etc.”4 Later analysts like R. E. G. Davies similarly mar-
veled at Aeroflot’s unique status among world airlines: “In size and stature by almost 
any measure of comparison, there has never been an airline quite like Aeroflot, and 
there never will be again” (2011:150).
The Soviet state, of course, celebrated Aeroflot’s size and unique responsibilities 
as signs of superiority. In contrast to Western airline companies that debased them-
selves in pursuit of profits, the Soviet airline was represented as a rationally orga-
nized unit of the socialist state that fulfilled critical needs of the planned economy 
1 On the KGB’s use of Aeroflot planes in 1968 to invade Czechoslovakia, which was reported in 
a Western aviation periodical, see Svik (2020:216–217).
2 Red Dawn, directed by John Milius (1984; United Artists). Quotation is from 55:15, when the 
colonel describes the surprise Soviet military assault on the US. 
3 On Browne’s career, see Witkin (1986).
4 Secor Browne, Aeroflot: Soviet Civil Aviation, pp. 1–2, Acc I, box 54, folder 1, PAWA Records.
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and advanced world peace.5 Its operations fell under the Chief Directorate of the 
Civil Air Fleet, which was created in 1923 and renamed the Ministry of Civil Aviation 
in 1964; “Aeroflot” became the airline’s shorthand name in 1932 (Sollinger 2014:26, 
38–39). Its branding as a national flag carrier put it on par with many Western airline 
corporations. But in legal terms, it would have to wait until after the Soviet Union’s 
collapse to be recognized as one. Following the post-1991 demise of the Ministry of 
Civil Aviation and the creation of around 180 airlines in Russia, a much downsized 
Aeroflot became an open joint-stock company in 1994 (308).
Scholarship on Aeroflot belongs to the wider literature on Russian aviation, 
which covers a variety of topics from aviation culture and military history to fighter 
pilots and aircraft design (Hardesty 1982; Davies 1992; Higham, Greenwood, and 
Hardesty 1998; Pennington 2001; Palmer 2006). Although official accounts spon-
sored by Aeroflot have chronicled its institutional history (Bugaev 1981; Molodtsov 
1987; Sutulov, Kartyshev, and Timchenko 1999; Ivanenko 2005), scholars of Russian 
aviation have largely ignored Aeroflot’s history as an airline. An early exception was 
Betsy Gidwitz’s rich study of Aeroflot’s international routes, in which she argued that 
its chief roles abroad were primarily political: “The nature of Aeroflot international 
conduct reflects a total Soviet ‘art of operations,’ which, according to Richard Pipes, 
‘draws no distinction between diplomatic, economic, psychological and military 
means of operation’” (1976:vii; emphasis in the original).6 Similar to assessments 
cited above, including Soviet sources, Gidwitz depicted Aeroflot as a unique airline 
closely tied to its state and fundamentally distinct from Western counterparts. While 
adding much to what we know about the Soviet airline, subsequent scholarship has 
done little to challenge these conclusions (e.g., Jones 1998).
In a more recent study of Aeroflot’s legal and regulatory history, Günther Sollinger 
likewise argues that Aeroflot distinguished itself from nonsocialist airlines because it 
combined “regulatory-administrative and commercial-operative functions” (2014:22). 
Echoing Gidwitz, he underscores that the Soviet carrier is best seen as “one element 
in a greater puzzle, part of a national plan drafted and decided by federal authorities 
in Moscow” (56).7 Aeroflot’s domestic operations, a unit fully integrated into the So-
viet state and its planned economy, are perhaps best described as a public utility, a 
category scholars have used for other socialist airlines (Filipczyk 1998). Although the 
airline is at times described loosely as a “company” (e.g., Svik 2020:49, 56), what that 
might mean in comparison to its Western counterparts is not explored. Aeroflot, 
scholars and others have assumed, was many things, but never a corporation in any 
meaningful sense and remained distinct from its peers in the West.
5 The Soviet magazine Grazhdanskaia aviatsiia (Civil Aviation) consistently represented Aero-
flot in this manner. For examples of the magazine’s negative representations of foreign corpora-
tions, see Pol’skoi (1957) and Ignat’ev (1959).
6 See also her assessment of Aeroflot’s political functions in her broader study of civil avia-
tion in Gidwitz (1980).
7 Such blurring of the lines between regulators and the airline industry is not entirely un-
known in the West as the recent case of Boeing’s 737 Max illustrates (see Laris, Duncan, and Aratani 
2019).
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This article complicates assumptions that Aeroflot was a unique airline on the 
world stage and shared little of substance with airline corporations outside the so-
cialist world. I do so by exploring the ways Aeroflot adopted, in its operations abroad, 
a range of practices normally associated with corporations. Such adaptations did not 
fundamentally change its status at home as a ministry fully integrated in the Soviet 
political economy. Moreover, I do not wish to explore—at least not yet—the rela-
tionship between Aeroflot’s corporate practices and either the Soviet Union’s col-
lapse in 1991 or the airline’s subsequent reemergence as a globally competitive cor-
poration. To be sure, scholars have demonstrated how the managers of state 
enterprises in the 1980s, who operated where capitalist and state socialist econo-
mies intersected or initiated limited privatization, played a critical role in state so-
cialism’s collapse (Verdery 1996:31–37). Instead, this article aims to show how Aero-
flot learned and adopted critical features of corporations—and even became a 
legally recognized corporation in a certain context—while remaining Soviet and 
bolstering the Soviet system.
To demonstrate this, I examine the Soviet airline’s entangled relationship with 
Pan American World Airways Inc. with which it shared a route between Moscow and 
New York starting in July 1968. Aeroflot’s route to New York, along with a later one to 
Washington and charter flights, raised the Soviet flag carrier’s global prestige, bol-
stered the Soviet state’s claims of pursuing peace, and helped achieve symbolic par-
ity with the USSR’s Cold War adversary. Routes to the US also allowed Aeroflot to 
fulfill one of its chief responsibilities abroad, earning hard currency. The Soviet air-
line achieved these political and economic goals abroad, I argue, by learning to be-
have like a Western airline corporation that made it anything but unique among 
world airlines. Its adopted corporate practices are best seen in Aeroflot’s ability to 
overcome a steep learning curve in a new market, robust advertising and branding 
campaigns, aggressive competition with Pan Am, circumventing regulators to gain 
market share, and legal defense in New York State court as a “foreign corporation.” 
In this article, I explore these facets of Aeroflot’s operations to argue that to the 
airline’s many functions we should add that of successfully becoming a corporation 
in the West’s political economy.
As a window onto the Cold War, Aeroflot and Pan Am’s relationship has been stud-
ied primarily “from above” at the top levels of governance and diplomatic relations. 
Hans Heymann Jr. (1972) provided the first history of the negotiations, frequently 
interrupted by Cold War incidents, that produced the US-Soviet Civil Air Agreement of 
1966, which regulated Aeroflot and Pan Am’s shared routes. More recently, Peter Svik 
(2020:81–94) has similarly examined how the Cold War persistently stymied both 
countries’ political and diplomatic efforts to forge the agreement. In addition, Svik 
explores how US and Soviet attempts to revise and expand the agreement faltered over 
the course of the 1970s and finally collapsed in the early 1980s (147–153). Overall, 
Svik argues that the Cold War, particularly its security and strategic aspects, was the 
driving force behind the development of postwar civil aviation, its regulatory regimes, 
and its technological developments with which the Soviet Union failed to keep up. For 
other scholars, such as Karl Lorentz Kleve (2020), the pursuit of air routes across the 
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Iron Curtain, especially in the mid-1950s, demonstrates instead how airlines like SAS 
and their governments successfully pushed back against the Cold War in pursuit of 
economic interests. Similar to Heymann’s earlier study, both Kleve and Svik take a 
bird’s-eye view of civil aviation by examining it from the perspective of the states and 
their bureaucracies in the overall context of the Cold War.8
This article shifts our attention to the two airlines themselves, Aeroflot and Pan 
Am, and their role in shaping the Cold War. Situated in between the states and their 
agencies that regulated civil aviation, on the one hand, and the passengers who con-
sumed air travel, on the other, the airlines and their executives provide a largely un-
examined perspective and source of influence on the Cold War. By focusing on the 
two airlines, this article presents a “history from the middle” and draws from previ-
ously unexamined archival sources for both airlines, mass media sources, and mem-
oirs.9 In this study, I trace Aeroflot and Pan Am’s relationship from the origins of the 
Moscow–New York air route in the late 1950s through their experience flying be-
tween the US and USSR in the late 1960s and 1970s. The two airlines’ “entangled 
history” reveals that neither operated as one might expect given the political econo-
mies they represented.10 Aeroflot bested Pan Am by earning more revenue, flying 
more passengers, and aggressively growing its business between the US and USSR. I 
end in the early 1980s, when all commercial flights were suspended between the two 
countries because of heightened Cold War tensions. Although Aeroflot and Pan Am 
renewed flights in 1986, this last chapter in their business relationship, set in the 
Reagan-Gorbachev era, requires a separate examination. This article, therefore, is 
chiefly concerned with Aeroflot’s and Pan Am’s operations during détente and with 
what their different experiences can tell us about the entangled roles of corpora-
tions and state socialist enterprises in the Cold War and late socialism.
Aeroflot And CorporAtions in the Cold WAr
Already before flying to the US, Aeroflot most approximated European flag carriers, 
such as Air France and Lufthansa, that were partially or majority owned by a state, 
pursued that state’s geopolitical goals, served as a symbol of national pride, and com-
peted for passengers through customer service and advertising (Sampson 1984; Dienel 
8 This bird’s-eye view is in part shaped by these authors’ choice of sources that favor endur-
ing representations of Aeroflot as a unique airline and an indistinguishable part of the Soviet state. 
Given his goal of tracing how a major US government decision was made, Heymann focused exclu-
sively on the top US government agencies involved in the air agreement; at the time he conducted 
his research, he did not have access to Soviet archival sources. In both Kleve’s and Svik’s studies 
Aeroflot’s role is refracted through the lens of foreign governments, international agencies, foreign 
airlines, and their communications with the Soviet state and its airline. Neither scholar, however, 
draws on Soviet published or archival sources, the latter of which include documentation intended 
for internal consumption, which reveals the perspectives of Aeroflot’s managers speaking among 
themselves and with their superiors in the Soviet government and Communist Party. 
9 I borrow the phrase “history from the middle” from Kennedy (2010:35–51). On the useful-
ness of this concept in Soviet historiography, see Doucette (2020) and Smolkin (2020).
10 On “entangled history,” see Werner and Zimmermann (2006:30–50).
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and Lyth 1998; Autier, Corcos, and Trépo 2001). In contrast, Pan Am was an informal 
flag carrier, a “chosen instrument” of US foreign policy, but always a private corpora-
tion not owned in whole or in part by its government (Van Vleck 2013). Thinking about 
Aeroflot as a national flag carrier that acted abroad like a corporation de-emphasizes 
its uniqueness. At the same time, it reveals a critical feature of the Soviet airline that 
has largely been ignored: Aeroflot’s ability to successfully adapt to different political 
economies and remain an integrated economic unit of the Soviet state. These were the 
political economies of the USSR and the broader state socialist world, the Global South, 
and the capitalist West. Whereas Pan Am succeeded well in the last two, it largely failed 
to do so in the first. In contrast, Aeroflot’s successes operating in all these political 
economies call for closer analysis, particularly since the airline did so while simultane-
ously falling behind in critical technologies such as engine design.11
In showing how Aeroflot adopted features of Western airline corporations, this 
article contributes to broader discussions about the corporation’s role in Russian 
history by focusing on late socialism. Scholars have shown wide variation in corpora-
tions in Russian history but have largely examined them before and after the Soviet 
period (Vinkovetsky 2011; Rogers 2015; Grinev 2016). Beyond Russian history, the 
corporation as a category of economic organization has changed significantly over 
time and place (Wilkins and Schröter 1998; Sicard 2015; Harris 2019). Even in the 
relatively short history of the United States, corporations saw significant transforma-
tions such as the shift from fulfilling a public good at a profit to pursuing purely 
private aims (Roy 1997; Sale 2011; Newfield 2014; Lamoreaux and Novak 2017). As 
the literature on European flag carriers cited above illustrates, a range of airline cor-
porate models existed with different types of ownership, economic goals, and rela-
tions to states and societies. Aeroflot’s experience, this article shows, demonstrates 
how a Soviet enterprise adopted corporate practices not from the remnants of pre-
revolutionary Russian corporations but from foreign corporations of the postwar era. 
European flag carriers and Pan Am were Aeroflot’s chief sources for learning to be a 
corporation, but other non-airline corporations also played these roles. In short, the 
corporate practices examined here were from entirely foreign sources and entered 
the Soviet entity in question during the Brezhnev era.
Following the Soviet collapse in 1991, the reappearance of corporations in Rus-
sia drew scholars to explore their prerevolutionary origins, as well as prerevolution-
ary resistance to corporations. Without the benefit of additional hindsight and ar-
chival sources available today, it made sense to conclude that the Soviet era had 
contributed little but destruction and vilification to the history of the Russian cor-
poration. An illustrative example of such assessments is Thomas C. Owen’s study 
(1995) that explores the history of corporations in Russia up to 1914, skips the So-
viet period, and then picks up their history anew in the late Gorbachev era. In this 
account, corporations in Russia faced a Sisyphean struggle against an ingrained, of-
ten xenophobic cultural opposition to their economic organization and to capitalism 
11 On the roles that aircraft engines played in developing the global civil aviation sector and 
how the Soviet Union fell behind despite numerous attempts to strike deals with Western compa-
nies for engines and their technologies, see Svik (2020:119–145, 205–220).
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more broadly. The Soviet system’s role in propagating such hostility is taken for 
granted. Moreover, in this view the Soviet system and its enterprises did nothing 
constructive to pave the way for the return of corporations in Russia until Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s reforms of the mid-1980s. While much has been written on the Soviet 
Union’s transfer and reverse engineering of Western technology throughout its his-
tory (Bailes 1981; Greenwood 1998; Hardesty 2001), inquiry into the country’s pos-
sible adaptations of corporate practices well before the Gorbachev era is lacking.
In contrast, this article suggests that Soviet enterprises like Aeroflot did not 
have to wait for perestroika to stop worrying and become a corporation, at least out-
side Soviet borders. I highlight the features Aeroflot began adapting in the late 1950s 
that were typical of corporations in the international airline industry. To be sure, the 
Soviet carrier always lacked key attributes of its American counterpart Pan Am such 
as private, shareholder ownership and the profit motive. However, Aeroflot often took 
on key features common among corporations in the twentieth century, including lim-
ited liability, predatory pricing, branding campaigns, public disclosure of assets, sta-
tus in courts of law as a legal person, ability to buy and sell property, and an operation 
that outlasted its creators, which in its case was the Soviet Union.12 Despite evidence 
that Aeroflot’s leadership in Moscow was resistant or simply slow to accept what its 
managers in New York were doing, the airline never seemed concerned about the 
broader ideological significance of these corporate adaptations and embraced them 
to great effect. Aeroflot’s adaptations cease to be strange once we also recognize the 
deeply authoritarian nature of modern corporations, which are organized quite unlike 
the democratic systems with which we assume they are naturally joined. Drawing from 
David E. Schrader’s observations (1993:134), Owen himself (1995:14) recognizes that 
there was something Soviet about corporations and their hostility to democratic 
norms, which was perhaps best illustrated by the sham elections of corporate boards 
that offered preselected candidates running for their seats unopposed.
This offhand comment suggesting there was something Soviet about twentieth-
century corporations and corporate practices—in Russia and beyond—is worth in-
vestigating further. Within the global airline industry today, the Aeroflot of the late 
Soviet era appears not so much like the hapless failure in customer service that ste-
reotypes would proclaim, but rather as a harbinger of the no-frills, authoritarian air-
line persistently undermining passengers’ rights, comfort, and even safety. Scholar-
ship on other aspects of state socialist economies has suggested useful ways to 
reexamine their roles in shaping present day realities, such as globalization, beyond 
the shopworn paradigms of state socialism’s failure, collapse, and sudden transition 
to market economies. For example, in her study of economists on both sides of the 
Iron Curtain, Johanna Bockman (2011) shows that neoliberalism was not just the 
invention of think-tank conservatives but also had longer “left-wing origins” among 
economists in Eastern Europe who had a deep interest in showing how markets could 
serve socialism. Bockman’s work has inspired scholars in other fields to explore how 
12 These characteristics are among the most commonly recognized in studies of twentieth-
century corporations (see, e.g., Roy 1997:259–286).
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socialism laid the foundations for other practices associated with neoliberalism, 
such as dependence on powerful states to enforce economic policies and the appro-
priation of long-term state socialist urban planning schemes (Zarecor 2018). The 
possible impact of Aeroflot’s Soviet incarnation on the Russian and global airline 
industries in the post-1991 era is beyond the scope of the present study but suggests 
another example. This article, therefore, works toward the question raised in Bock-
man’s study of economists by establishing how Aeroflot was already, well before the 
Gorbachev years, learning how to be a corporation in ways that would make it well 
suited to reemerge from the Soviet collapse and even shape how we fly today.
To that end, this article focuses on Aeroflot’s Soviet-era activities in the United 
States where, I would argue, it most clearly adopted corporate attributes among all 
of its foreign operations. Stark differences in the US and Soviet political economies 
enabled Aeroflot to excel in the American market while simultaneously curtailing 
Pan Am’s ability to do the same in the USSR.13 But the airlines’ own actions were also 
key. Whereas Aeroflot was eager and able to adapt to a political economy not of its 
own making on a route that was of far greater importance to the Soviet state than to 
the American government, Pan Am was largely unwilling and incapable of adapting to 
the Soviet political economy. Insofar as commercial aviation was concerned, this 
article shows that détente was rather good for Soviet business but not so much for 
American business.
Beyond the specific case of Aeroflot and Pan Am’s relationship, this article con-
tributes to a growing body of scholarship that shows how corporations and other 
non-state actors—from mass media companies to shipyards—shaped the Cold War 
conflict rather than merely being affected by it (Carlson 2009; Harris 2010; Autio-
Sarasmo and Miklóssy 2011; Mikkonen and Koivunen 2018; Matala 2019). The role of 
state socialist enterprises in the Cold War—beyond being faceless “Soviet officials” 
working on behalf of an undifferentiated “Soviet system”—is only beginning to 
come into focus as scholars examine such institutions as Inturist (Salmon 2006; 
Gorsuch 2011) and architects and construction enterprises operating in the Global 
South (Stanek 2020). Aeroflot, this article contends, similarly deserves closer exami-
nation for how its managers played their role in shaping the Cold War by adopting key 
attributes of a Western airline corporation. Moreover, Aeroflot and Pan Am’s business 
partnership fits depictions of the Cold War (Shcherbenok 2010; Sanchez-Sibony 2014) 
as an asymmetrical conflict, but with a twist. It was Aeroflot, not Pan Am, that was 
better at exploiting their shared routes. While Aeroflot’s success does not change 
what historians argue was American dominance at the macroeconomic level (San-
chez-Sibony 2014), it suggests that at the microeconomic level a Soviet enterprise 
could be more effective—or at least more wily and flexible—than we think.
By exploring Aeroflot’s business relationship with Pan Am and its adaptation of 
corporate practices, this article suggests that we examine further the impact of cor-
porations and state socialist enterprises on the Cold War in three main areas. The 
first is their role in creating the means of communication and travel that allowed 
13 These differences in political economy are noted in Gidwitz (1980:147).
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non-state actors and ordinary citizens to move across the Iron Curtain and play their 
own roles in shaping the Cold War.14 Second, we need to better understand how cor-
porations and state socialist enterprises, doing business across the Iron Curtain, in-
fluenced one another’s internal operations, as well as their respective governments. 
And third, the fate of corporations and state socialist enterprises in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s provides case studies to better elucidate who the winners, losers, and 
survivors of the Cold War were beyond our standard narratives of which states 
emerged victorious and which ones vanished.
origins of An Air route
Beginning in the mid-1950s, Aeroflot underwent a significant expansion that shifted 
Soviet aviation’s focus from barnstorming spectacles of the Stalin era to mass pas-
senger traffic.15 By 1961 it became “the world’s largest airline” in passengers and 
passenger-miles flown (Davies 1964:499) and later used this catchy label in its 
branding strategy (see, e.g., Washington Post 1980). Yet Aeroflot remained a primar-
ily domestic airline with only 1 to 2 percent of its traffic beyond Soviet borders 
throughout the postwar era (Narodnoe khoziaistvo 1971:463, 1986:350). In contrast, 
Pan Am was a predominantly international airline that celebrated American citizens’ 
mobility and foresaw a globally integrated world on American terms. Founded by the 
businessman and aviator Juan Trippe in 1927, Pan Am was a private company but also 
the US government’s “chosen instrument” to advance American foreign policy and 
military interests abroad (Van Vleck 2007, 2009, 2013). Unlike Pan Am’s celebration 
of global mobility, Aeroflot advertised its routes to Soviet citizens as signs of social-
ist modernization and invitations to fly within the USSR.16 Because of strict foreign 
travel restrictions, especially to the West but also the socialist bloc (Gorsuch 2011; 
Light 2012), flying abroad was rarely emphasized. Instead, Aeroflot’s international 
routes reflected global prestige and solidarity with the decolonized world.17 Whereas 
Pan Am had to answer to two masters—the market and the US government—Aeroflot 
had only one, the Soviet state. This critical difference, as we shall see, plagued the 
airlines’ partnership to the detriment of Pan Am.
Aeroflot and Pan Am’s relationship evolved on multiple fronts of the Cold War 
from competing visions of consumer modernity (Harris 2020) and representations of 
flight attendants (Vantoch 2013:125–152) to technical assistance in the Global 
South (Van Vleck 2009). The phase of their closest relationship emerged from Ameri-
14 Scholars are presently exploring how airlines such as Aeroflot and Pan Am contributed such 
means in the service of international festivals (see, e.g., Razlogova n.d.; Wofford 2018).
15 On Soviet aviation culture under Joseph Stalin, see Palmer (2006). For official statistics on 
passenger traffic from the late Stalin era through the Brezhnev years, see Narodnoe khoziaistvo 
(1966:512, 1971:428, 1986:324, 350).
16 On routes as signs of Soviet modernization, see “Vam, passazhiry” (1967:2–3). On advertis-
ing internal air travel, see Aeroflot’s posters in Kotov (2008) and brochures in RGAE, f. 743, op. 1, d. 
392, ll. 4–22.
17 For examples, see Smolin (1961:24–25) and Danilychev (1961:15).
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can and Soviet efforts to find a way out of the Cold War. In the late 1950s the super-
powers forged a mini-détente through the 1958 US-Soviet Agreement on Cultural, 
Technological, and Educational Exchanges, which called for an air link between the 
two countries. As the Soviet Union’s only airline, Aeroflot would fly such a route. It 
was assumed that Pan Am would do so on the American side, serving the US govern-
ment once again on a sensitive foreign policy endeavor.18 Negotiations on a bilateral 
civil air agreement took an unusual amount of time—10 years—primarily because 
flare-ups such as the Cuban Missile Crisis stalled talks. When the shared route was 
finally launched in July 1968, both sides refused in the spirit of détente to let the 
Vietnam War or the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia derail it (Heymann 1972).
From the Soviets’ perspective, the route to New York was attractive for a variety 
of reasons. By linking Moscow and New York—instead of Moscow and Washington—
the route highlighted the ideological clash between socialism and capitalism but 
also promoted détente and the very parity with the United States the Soviet leader-
ship craved. For Aeroflot the air route between Moscow and New York was the culmi-
nation of expanding routes into the capitalist West and Global South for over a de-
cade (Gidwitz 1976:320–335, 446–454). Its international routes bolstered the USSR’s 
mutually reinforcing identities as leader of the socialist world, a normal country that 
followed international standards, and a friend to developing countries. Similar to all 
its routes outside the socialist world, Aeroflot’s enduring motivation and measure of 
success for flying to the US was earning hard currency.19 As Sergei Pavlov, a senior 
official with a long career in Aeroflot’s foreign operations, later recalled in his mem-
oirs, “convertible currency” was the Soviet airline’s main concern among its revenue 
streams (2010:218–219).
In contrast, Pan Am’s presence in the USSR had nothing to do with earning mon-
ey for the US government nor, as its executives soon realized, for the American car-
rier. In encouraging Pan Am to pursue negotiations with Aeroflot, State Department 
officials in June 1956 “stated that the idea of Pan American serving Moscow fits into 
the Department of State’s general objective of breaking down the Iron Curtain.”20 
Such prospects dovetailed nicely with Pan Am’s vision of creating a borderless world 
where Americans traveled freely.21 As an internal memo put it, “If [Pan Am] were suc-
18 Pan Am was the American airline the US government designated in 1945 to fly to Moscow 
and Leningrad if that ever became possible (“USSR [Aeroflot]; Mr. Preece’s memorandum of July 23, 
1974,” p. 1, Acc II, box 600, folder 18, PAWA Records). Soviet aviation officials were aware of the 
1958 cultural exchange agreement and its call for an air link. See the Russian language copy of the 
agreement with the section on aviation marked for emphasis in RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4772, ll. 
38–47.
19 The central importance of earning hard currency is well illustrated in annual reports that 
Aeroflot offices in foreign countries sent back to Moscow. See, e.g., Aeroflot’s report from Guinea in 
1981 in RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 3674, ll. 19–46; and its 1973 report from Uganda in RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, 
d. 1597, ll. 293–313.
20 “Memorandum of Meeting Held at Department of State on June 12, 1956,” Acc II, box 231, 
folder 17, PAWA Records.
21 “Russian Negotiations,” July 19, 1956, Acc II, box 231, folder 17, PAWA Records.
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cessful, the US public at large would have a fine example of Pan American air service 
in the national interest.”22 Nevertheless, Pan Am executives expressed serious con-
cerns over the route’s economic prospects.23 Chief among them was the likelihood 
that Aeroflot would win most of the traffic between Moscow and New York because of 
Soviet restrictions on foreign travel and doubts that any Soviet citizen could ever 
really choose between Aeroflot and Pan Am.24
Given these anticipated problems, why did Pan Am pursue the route? One reason 
was fear of a damaged brand lest another carrier like TWA jump in if Pan Am opted 
out.25 In 1972 Pan Am executive John Leslie cited additional factors in an interview 
with Hans Heymann Jr. for the latter’s study of the US-Soviet Civil Air Agreement. 
“We had the obligation to do it,” Leslie bluntly admitted, putting a fine point on Pan 
Am’s responsibilities to the US government. But he added, “We had a rather difficult 
line to steer between doing, meeting our responsibilities, doing our job and not los-
ing our shirt doing it, not being bad businessmen.” Heymann contended that Pan Am 
and especially Juan Trippe had also been driven by “romanticism” in pursuing an air 
route to Russia and only later realized its economic pitfalls.26
Vladimir Samorukov, who headed Aeroflot’s New York office from 1967 to 1969, 
similarly recalled in his memoirs Trippe’s enthusiasm for the route and his hopes for 
partnering with the Soviets to build “American-style hotels in Moscow and Lenin-
grad.” Samorukov shared Trippe’s excitement and became one of Aeroflot’s greatest 
champions for learning how to operate successfully in the American market but also 
how to compromise with Pan Am when conflicts arose. While voices in the Central 
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party worried about his embrace of marketing as 
a step too far toward “capitalist economics,” Samorukov largely prevailed at getting 
Aeroflot to adopt practices of an ordinary airline corporation (Samorukov 2003:45, 
54–55, 66, 83, 117).
Ultimately, Pan Am found itself navigating the conflicting economic and politi-
cal obligations of a “chosen instrument” without the safety net of a state-owned 
carrier. Moreover, it fulfilled responsibilities on behalf of a state that was less inter-
ested in the airline’s bottom line than in pursuing the Cold War. In contrast, Aero-
flot’s goals in flying to New York were narrow, did not conflict with one another, and 
did not put the airline at odds with the government it served. In these respects, it 
embodied the ideal version of the flag carrier corporation. Its motivations also meant 
that Aeroflot and its government always wanted the route much more than either the 
22 Dave Parsons, “Subject: Probings on Air Service to Moscow,” Acc II, box 231, folder 17, PAWA 
Records.
23 “Profitability of Potential Operation to Russia,” November 5, 1957, Acc II, box 231, folder 17, 
PAWA Records.
24 Russell Adams, “Memorandum on Issues Presented in Negotiations for US-USSR Air Trans-
port Agreement,” Acc II, box 231, folder 17, PAWA Records.
25 Adams, “Memorandum on Issues Presented in Negotiations.”
26 “Interview with John C. Leslie by Hans Heymann on February 11, 1972,” pp. 5–6, Acc I, box 
11, folder 7, PAWA Records.
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US government—which used prospects for the route as a bargaining chip in broader 
negotiations with the USSR—or Pan Am, which doubted its economic feasibility.27
le Arning from the AmeriCAns
During 10 years of US-Soviet negotiations over the Civil Air Agreement, Pan Am and 
Aeroflot had time to learn about one another and prepare for the route connecting 
Moscow and New York. Pan Am was already an established global airline and the pros-
pects of flying to the USSR had no discernible effect on its business model, particu-
larly since the route would constitute a tiny part of its traffic. In contrast, Aeroflot 
had a steep learning curve similar to a corporation entering an unfamiliar but poten-
tially rewarding market. For both symbolic and financial reasons, the route promised 
to play a much greater role in Aeroflot’s operations than it did for Pan Am. To be sure, 
the Soviet state and especially Nikita Khrushchev, its leader during the first several 
years of negotiations, bristled at suggestions in foreign media that they had lessons 
to learn from the West (Harris 2010). But behind closed doors and beyond the glare 
of the Western media or the pressure of diplomatic talks, Aeroflot’s managers took a 
more realistic approach to their airline’s place in the world and eagerly sought to 
learn as much from the Americans as possible. In contrast, Pan Am—the unofficial 
flagship of the world’s most innovative economy—was not as adaptable because it 
assumed the world, even the socialist world, should operate according to norms it 
had shaped.
While Pan Am executives worried about the economics of the air route, their 
Soviet counterparts got to work finding out all they could about commercial aviation 
in the US and striking their first business deals. In August 1960 the head of Aeroflot, 
Evgenii Loginov, dispatched a delegation to the United States to absorb everything 
on topics from airport design, passenger service, and advertising to the training of 
personnel, the organization of airlines, and booking systems. Already thinking about 
building up Aeroflot’s brand in the US, Loginov urged his delegation to “widely pub-
licize Aeroflot’s activities among the American public, airlines, and tourist agencies.” 
(We will see later that a tourist agent in New York may have been the source of this 
recommendation on forward branding.) Loginov also asked the delegates to report 
on aspects of American commercial aviation that Aeroflot could adopt. In addition to 
learning as much as they could through consultations with the US Federal Aviation 
Administration, the Commerce Department, and Pan Am, the Soviet delegates visited 
major airports including those in Miami and Boston, New York’s Idlewild Airport, 
Washington National Airport, and Dulles Airport.28
In extensive reports after their journey—including photographs of Dulles Air-
port’s construction and its futuristic “people movers”—the delegation suggested 
many improvements to Aeroflot’s operations. Among the proposed changes were the 
27 On these critical differences in Soviet and American approaches to the air agreement, see 
Heymann (1972).
28 RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4773, ll. 33–35.
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thorough “reconstruction and widening of old air terminals,” modernizing all tech-
nology used to process passengers, streamlining delivery of timely information on 
flights to information desks, aligning baggage handling with “the practice of airlines 
in the USA,” improving souvenirs and advertisements, and raising the quality of in-
flight food “especially on international routes” to “the level of the best airlines.” 
Priorities in improvement were geared toward foreign travelers. The delegates called 
for upgrading the interior design of Aeroflot’s passenger planes, “especially those 
designated for foreign routes, bringing it to the level of international standards.” 
They also proposed reductions in noise and vibrations caused by Soviet engines, more 
efficient use of airplanes by reducing time on the ground, “improvements to the tech-
nological worthiness [tekhnologichnost’] of aircraft” to reduce repairs, and the wide 
use of televisions to assist airport operations and passenger service.29
Aeroflot’s managers and employees had long learned about foreign airlines by 
reading the monthly magazine Grazhdanskaia aviatsiia, whose reporting dutifully 
championed Soviet superiority in the air and condemned the irrational competition of 
capitalist carriers (see, e.g., Pol’skoi 1957; Danilychev 1961). In a similar vein, the 
Soviet delegates on the 1960 tour kept up appearances in public. “US Airports Fail to 
Awe Russians,” read a deflated headline in the New York Times. “It is very difficult to 
surprise us,” one delegate confidently said; at most, the newspaper reported, the So-
viet guests had found the tour “pleasant and instructive” (Hudson 1960). But while 
discussing the same 1960 visit behind closed doors, Aeroflot’s delegates and top man-
agers dropped the pretension of Soviet aviation’s superiority over hapless capitalists 
and were all too eager to learn from the Americans and modernize Aeroflot accord-
ingly. Similar to a corporation anticipating growth in a new market with lucrative fi-
nancial and branding prospects, Aeroflot was highly motivated to overcome its learn-
ing curve and get its act together to meet standards dictated by the American market.
In addition to its own fact-finding missions, the Soviet airline received unsolic-
ited advice from American companies eager to help and perhaps earn its business.30 In 
this manner, Aeroflot was already providing the context for other non-state actors, 
from companies to ordinary citizens, to play their own roles in easing Cold War ten-
sions. In turn, such contacts allowed Aeroflot to learn more about what it meant to be 
an airline corporation operating in the US. Travel guide companies, for example, struck 
an optimistic note about the Soviet airline’s prospects but subtly coached it on infor-
mation it should provide to customers and on capturing traffic to major world events 
like the 1960 Rome Olympics.31 Aeroflot kept track of such solicitations and even re-
plied. In one case, the Soviet airline explained that Pan Am, TWA, and Northwest Ori-
ent Airlines handled its advertising in the United States according to “a commercial 
29 RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 5718, ll. 1, 54–55, 68–70.
30 Unless otherwise noted, the letters examined here that Aeroflot received from American 
companies and individuals were written in English.
31 See, e.g., solicitations Aeroflot received in 1960 from the publisher of the Shuler Interna-
tional Airline and Steamship Guide and from the company American Overseas Tourist (RGAE, f. 9527, 
op. 1, d. 4774, l. 18; RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4772, l. 127).
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agreement.”32 Aeroflot also brokered interline agreements that allowed American car-
riers to sell tickets for itineraries that included Aeroflot flights. Correspondence with 
TWA indicates that the Soviet carrier needed to be coaxed into such an agreement, the 
finer obligations of which TWA had to remind Aeroflot about when it came to paying 
commissions to travel agents. It was in Aeroflot’s best interest, the American carrier 
stressed, since “the US is a tremendous market for travel to the USSR.”33
The prospect of a direct air route between the two countries encouraged indi-
vidual Americans far from Washington, DC, or top US airlines to reach out to Aeroflot 
in the name of business opportunities, employment, and their own versions of dé-
tente. George Goshaw, a self-identified “Pioneer of Alaska” who had originally hoped 
to extend his fur trade into Siberia in 1919, outlined his plans in 1959 for creating an 
“Air Craft Transportation Corporation” for flying Soviet and American tourists be-
tween the two countries, as well as bringing Russian furs to the American market.34 
From New York, George Studley of the Julien J. Studley Real Estate Company gently 
reminded Aeroflot in 1960 of his firm’s past correspondence with the Soviet carrier 
and the many services it could still provide in securing office space, working with the 
Port Authority of New York at Idlewild Airport, and contracting with their own archi-
tecture firm, Freidin-Studley Associates, to outfit Aeroflot’s offices. “You may be in-
terested to know that two of our executives have a good speaking knowledge of 
Russian,” Studley helpfully noted.35
Another correspondent, Walter Winefka, was a former pilot for the US Air Force 
and Japan Airlines who wrote on more than one occasion in 1960 seeking employ-
ment as an Aeroflot pilot. Drawing from globalist visions of aviation, he asserted that 
“I, as well as countless other Pilots, feel that someday all Airlines will be intercon-
nected with each other, as a result of the vast expansion of all Airlines, [sic] I have 
taken it upon myself to offer my services as a Transport Pilot with the Russian Air-
lines.” Aeroflot kindly turned down Winefka’s offer, pointing out that its pilots had to 
be Soviet citizens.36
Undeterred and advising them to drop this policy, Winefka later offered to be-
come Aeroflot’s “representative or American Liaison,” manage its advertising and 
regulatory logistics in the US, and vet and hire its pilots. In a reference to anti-Sovi-
et sentiment and troublesome American labor unions, he coached Aeroflot by point-
ing out that “by hiring pilots on the open market on an individual contract basis, you 
protect yourself by not exposing yourself to massive regimentation and possible re-
sistance groups or prejudiced individuals.” Winefka apparently saw no irony in urg-
32 RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4774, l. 17.
33 RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4772, ll. 22–35; RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4774, ll. 26–27. On Pan Am’s 
interline agreement with Aeroflot, see correspondence from 1963 from the American carrier’s sales 
manager (RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 5586, ll. 50, 73).
34 Goshaw sent his letter in English to the Soviet embassy in Washington, which forwarded it to 
Aeroflot through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4772, ll. 119–120, 123–125).
35 RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4773, ll. 157–158.
36 RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4772, ll. 55–57, 53.
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ing the first workers’ state to undermine labor unions and collective bargaining. Or 
perhaps he intuitively understood that Aeroflot—like any corporation but especially 
one that operated in a country that had long since quashed autonomous labor 
unions—would prefer individual contractors since “you are and remain in control of 
Employer and Employee relationship” and a pilot only worked well “if he realizes that 
he is under an individual contract.”37
In short, Winefka anticipated one of the suggestions of this article: that Aero-
flot’s formal transition into a corporation after 1991 was not the revolution it might 
seem on the surface, once we appreciate the authoritarian nature of corporations, 
their distaste for independent labor unions, and their prohibitions against employ-
ees’ free speech. None of these features of corporations would have been foreign 
concepts for Soviet enterprises.
Normally, it was Americans sympathetic to communist ideology who, we assume, 
were most likely to reach out to the Soviets and work for them enthusiastically to 
spread their global influence.38 In contrast, Winefka’s letter suggests that the mini-
détente of the late 1950s and the novelty of Aeroflot altered these dynamics, so that 
now, for a go-it-alone American frustrated with how the US aviation industry and 
labor unions treated individual contractors working for the Soviet airline was worth 
a try. After all, as he insisted in his first letter, “I am neither prejudiced nor bigoted 
and I apply for the position [of Aeroflot pilot] with an open mind.”39 To a pilot like 
Winefka thinking about how commercial aviation was expanding around the world, 
Aeroflot was an airline company that just happened to be Soviet and its connections 
to communist ideology were unimportant. If it had the wherewithal to undermine 
labor unions in favor of individual contractors, so much the better.
Travel agencies, including those run by Jewish émigrés from Russia, and Intur-
ist’s people already in New York were also key to Aeroflot’s efforts to learn about the 
American market. In his memoirs, Samorukov recalls that Inturist’s chief in New York, 
Oleg Lyskin, explained how both Pan Am and Aeroflot would actually be competing 
with many foreign carriers for American passengers. Aeroflot would need to learn 
about the many “unofficial discounts” airlines pitched to travel agencies to get their 
business, including padded commissions and free tickets. On Lyskin’s recommenda-
tion, Samorukov paid a visit to Iulii Khorton, the head of Union Tours and an émigré 
originally from Odessa who had done business with Inturist since the early 1930s.40 
In his memoirs, Samorukov drew upon ethnic stereotypes of Jews as intermediaries 
and masters of market relations when recalling Khorton’s coaching of the uninitiated 
as “advice from an old Jew.” Making money was the lifeblood of New York, Khorton 
counseled him, not propaganda (presumably, that was Washington’s purview). Fur-
37 RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4773, ll. 56–58.
38 For a study that complicates this assumption in the interwar period by showing, for in-
stance, how the Soviet Union reached out to ideological opponents from abroad, see David-Fox 
(2012:247–284).
39 RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4772, l. 56.
40 Samorukov did not specify whether Khorton emigrated from Odessa before or after 1917.
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thermore, it was an airline’s job to make sales pitches to travel agencies and not the 
other way around, although here Samorukov could be forgiven for thinking otherwise 
given what had turned up in Aeroflot’s mailbag, as discussed above. In any case, 
Khorton cautioned Samorukov not to depend on Pan Am for help selling fares since it 
was “Aeroflot’s competitor” and had “enough of its own problems” (Samorukov 
2003:55–58).
Gabriel Reiner, head of the Cosmos Travel Agency and a Jewish émigré from pre-
revolutionary Russia, similarly helped Aeroflot find its bearings and advertise its ser-
vices (New York Times 1969). Samorukov recalls his eagerness to get advice from 
Reiner in 1967 upon the recommendation of an Aeroflot colleague who noted that 
Reiner “has close ties to the [US] government” (2003:67–68). Indeed, Reiner had 
worked during World War II in the Office of War Information and even had a hand in 
personally nudging Khrushchev during a reception at Spasso House in Moscow in 
1955 to open up the USSR to foreign tourism. The occasion was a goodwill chess 
match Reiner helped organize for the State Department along with someone he knew 
at the Soviet Union’s UN mission in New York (New York Times 1969). According to 
Samorukov, Reiner’s son Sidney inherited his father’s “close ties with government 
circles” to Aeroflot’s benefit when Sidney recommended that Samorukov consult di-
rectly with Marshall Shulman, at the time in the State Department, to resolve some 
outstanding issues with Pan Am in 1978 (Samorukov 2003:168–169).
Samorukov’s account illustrates that, below the glare of intense Cold War rivalry, 
Aeroflot’s managers on the ground both cultivated and were drawn into a network of 
American non-state actors with personal ties to the Soviet Union. This helped ease 
the Soviet airline’s entry into the American market, paper over problems with the 
State Department, and adopt a realistic and competitive approach to Pan Am. In 
short, such contacts assisted Aeroflot’s managers in learning the informal rules of 
running an airline corporation in the US, which the 1966 Civil Air Agreement negoti-
ated by Soviet and American diplomats did little to reveal.
Reiner’s engagement with Aeroflot illustrates again how corporations and state 
socialist enterprises created a space across the Iron Curtain for an individual Ameri-
can and his company to play their own part in pushing the Cold War from conflict to 
détente and mutually beneficial economic relations. To be sure, Reiner’s own enthu-
siasm for Aeroflot long predated Samorukov’s arrival in New York in the late 1960s. In 
February 1960 Reiner had urged the Soviet Embassy to boost Aeroflot’s brand in the 
US before direct flights started. Aeroflot officials, he wrote, had rebuffed his offer “to 
represent them here in connection with publicity.” He faulted their misguided as-
sumption that such publicity was not warranted because Aeroflot did not have a 
route into the US. Reiner stressed how vital it was “to prepare the ground by a lot of 
good-will in advance as it takes years to put across the name of an airline to the 
travelling public.”41 By August 1960, as we saw above, Loginov changed the airline’s 
tune on forward branding. Whether Reiner’s advice played a direct role is not clear. 
41 RGAE, f. 9527, op. 1, d. 4772, ll. 4–5. For more correspondence from Reiner, see RGAE, f. 9527, 
op. 1, d. 4774, ll. 43–50. Reiner wrote this latter set of letters to Aeroflot in Russian.
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Nonetheless, it showed Aeroflot’s willingness to adopt an advertising strategy that, 
as this American businessman explained, was standard industry practice.
In anticipation of the air route, enterprising American companies like Reiner’s 
positioned themselves to do business with Aeroflot and teach the Soviet flag carrier 
about the airline business. For its part, Aeroflot acted like an airline corporation set-
ting out on a new venture in unfamiliar skies. The airline’s leaders such as Loginov, 
as well as delegates and managers on the ground like Samorukov, were genuinely re-
ceptive to learn as much as they could about American commercial aviation. In addi-
tion to their own fact-finding efforts, they benefitted from the unsolicited sugges-
tions of American companies and individuals, including well-connected and 
well-informed émigrés from Russia who worked in the US tourism industry. As Samo-
rukov unironically recalled about his first domestic flight to Dallas, “For certain I 
wanted to know, to see, to feel how to ‘fly the American way,’” as an American Airlines 
advertisement urged him to do (2003:74).
Samorukov further documented the many lessons that he and his Aeroflot col-
leagues mastered and the everyday corporate practices they adopted to make their 
route to New York successful. These included luncheons at Pan Am’s exclusive Clipper 
Club to paper over conflicts; the awkward ritual of a public hearing before the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, which included public disclosure of $125 million in Aeroflot’s 
global assets; and the mundane processes of opening a bank account at Chase Man-
hattan, retaining the services of a lawyer, monitoring press reports on their business, 
and dealing with a travel agent’s bounced check of $25,000 for a charter flight 
(Samorukov 2003:71–72, 81, 87–92, 107–108, 112). Driving this desire to learn from 
the Americans was the goal of successfully operating an air route to New York, which 
would help Aeroflot meet its obligations to earn hard currency and raise Soviet pres-
tige on the world stage. 
Advertising An Air route
After many years of delays because of Cold War incidents, the US-Soviet Civil Air 
Agreement was signed in November 1966, followed by a commercial air agreement 
between Aeroflot and Pan Am in January 1967 (Heymann 1972:v, 10–11). The air 
route connecting the US and USSR opened in July 1968, when Aeroflot and Pan Am 
made their inaugural flights to New York and Moscow, respectively. American mass 
media extensively covered the story and Life magazine dutifully bestowed upon the 
route its iconic image with its cover photo of a Pan Am flight attendant embracing 
her Soviet counterpart (figure 1) (Baltimore Sun 1967; Hartford Courant 1967; Life 
1968; New York Times 1968a, 1968b; Starr 1968; Washington Post 1968; Witkin 1968). 
Soviet mass media offered comparatively far less coverage.42 This contrast reflected 
real differences in the Soviet and American political economies that shaped each 
airline’s subsequent experience starting in advertising.
42  For exceptions, see Gofman (1968); Kurdiumov and Raspevin (1968); Literaturnaia gazeta 
(1968); Sil’chenko (1968).
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Figure 1. Cover of Life magazine, July 26, 1968. Reprinted with permission from Getty Images
In the Soviet context, strict restrictions on foreign travel were a political decision 
that curtailed the market that international airlines could access within the USSR. In 
the US, the absence of political restrictions on citizens’ travel opened a vibrant market 
for travel agencies, as well as Pan Am and Aeroflot, to capture their business. Aeroflot 
had access to that market, allowing it to operate like an ordinary airline corporation. In 
contrast, Pan Am had little access to the Soviet economy and could not act like a So-
viet enterprise since doing so would have meant becoming part of the Soviet state. Pan 
Am also lacked inside the USSR the informal networking that Samorukov enjoyed 
through émigrés from Russia and local businesses in New York. Advertising was an 
early indication that such barriers to the Soviet political economy were simply too high 
for Pan Am to overcome but created opportunities Aeroflot could leverage.
Among its many provisions, the 1966 air transport agreement mandated “fair 
and equal opportunity for the designated airline of each Contracting Party to operate 
and promote the agreed services” (International Legal Materials 1967:84). In other 
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words, Aeroflot and Pan Am were free to advertise as each saw fit. At first glance, 
Aeroflot was no match for the advertising prowess of a well-established American 
corporation with worldwide experience selling the jet-set lifestyle (Thomas 1987; 
Hühne 2015:16–49; Hühne 2016). Aeroflot’s domestic and foreign advertising was a 
comparatively restrained affair.
In his memoirs Samorukov recalls how Aeroflot’s embrace of advertising was yet 
another part of its learning curve in the US. While Pan Am executives were quickly learn-
ing that advertising inside the Soviet Union was almost impossible, Aeroflot successfully 
built its brand among American customers with modest financial means and the services 
of the advertising firm Pampel and Associates. The Soviet flag carrier invested $20,000 in 
ads for the inaugural flights, including almost $10,000 for a full-page ad in the New York 
Times (Samorukov 2003:91). Over time, the Soviet carrier developed a respectable adver-
tising presence. It ran ads that exoticized the Soviet Union and sold the experience of 
flying Aeroflot as a gateway to Russian culture. For tourists on their way to Japan, Aero-
flot offered a stopover vacation in the USSR for the white nights in Leningrad and a Volga 
River cruise and even urged them to “go back in time to the fabulous era of Sheherezade 
[of One Thousand and One Nights], among the minarets, mosques and madrasas of exotic 
Central Asia” (New York Times 1970a, 1970b). In the 1970s Aeroflot ads celebrated its 
growth into “The World’s Largest Airline” and exhorted passengers with the tag line 
“You’ll enjoy it! You’ll never forget it!” (New York Times 1977). Its advertisements tar-
geted specific audiences such as youth travelers (New York Times 1971) and tapped into 
the spirit of détente with a new route to Washington, DC, starting in 1974 (Washington 
Post 1974). And like many ordinary corporations, Aeroflot benefited from free publicity 
courtesy of mass media (Life 1968; Gwertzman 1973), long excerpts of which Samorukov 
proudly reproduces in his memoirs (2003:100–101, 107–108).
Whereas Aeroflot routinely advertised routes to the US to foreign audiences, it 
made little effort to do so within the USSR beyond a few, small advertisements in lo-
cal Moscow newspapers (Moscow News 1968; Moskovskaia pravda 1968; Vecherniaia 
Moskva 1968, 1969). The Soviet public—particularly outside Moscow—likely never 
learned about Aeroflot’s route to New York from official sources. In contrast, Pan Am 
intended to widely advertise to Muscovites and turned to its chief advertising firm, 
the J. Walter Thompson company (JWT), to run its campaign. While the start date of 
the new route remained in flux, JWT’s Robert Weikart negotiated in early 1967 with 
the head of Vneshtorgreklama, Anatolii Vasiliev, over the finer points of Pan Am’s ads 
set to run in Moscow’s local papers.43 An original plan of running Pan Am ads in four 
newspapers was cut back to two Moscow dailies, the ads’ size was reduced, and their 
cost raised.44 Despite signs that unnamed Soviet officials somewhere along the line 
were less than enthusiastic about running Pan Am ads in Moscow newspapers, JWT 
cheerfully set about designing visually captivating ads with snappy copy enticing 
Soviet citizens to pack their bags, presumably for that long-awaited trip to New York.
43 Vneshtorgreklama handled advertising for the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
44 Letters from Weikart to Vasiliev dated March 7, 1967, and April 4, 1967, in JWT Box PA70 (F-
-Pan Am 1967 [2]). 
Steven e. HarriS. tHe WOrLD’S LarGeSt airLine… 39
For example, a Russian-language ad, drafted in March 1967, featured an airplane 
flying above the New York City skyline with a headline that boldly proclaimed, “Start-
ing May 1, Pan American Airways will fly nonstop between Moscow and New York.”45 
Its copy celebrated the flight’s nine-hour direct route but helpfully pointed out that 
“we can fly you any day of the week to New York from most major European cities (via 
connecting carrier from Moscow). Either way, you’ll enjoy cuisine by the famous res-
taurant, Maxim’s of Paris, and a movie* and stereophonic music” (emphasis in the 
original).46 Echoing such convenience, the Russian-language ad “Starting July 16, 
New York without Changing Planes on Pan Am’s Boeing 707 Jets” (see figure 2) in-
vited Soviet passengers to take advantage of the layover in Copenhagen, “where, if 
you wish, you may spend some time. From there, on any day you choose, Pan Am will 
fly you directly to New York at no extra cost.”47
Figure 2. “Starting July 16, New York without Changing Planes on Pan Am’s Boeing 707 Jets.” 
Courtesy of the David M. Rubenstein Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Duke University48
45 May 1, 1967, would not be the actual start date; as noted earlier, the route was delayed on 
more than one occasion.
46 Sample ad in Russian dated March 31, 1967, in JWT Box PA70 (F--Pan Am 1967 [2]). An 
English-language copy of this ad was also included in these materials; I have quoted here from that 
version. The asterisk indicated an additional charge of 2 roubles and 37 kopecks for the film.
47 See this Russian-language ad in JWT Box PA76, folder 4. The quotations from the ad here 
are drawn from an English-language draft.
48 JWT Box PA76, folder 4.
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Another proposed ad touched on the sensitive question of Soviet émigrés 
living in the US and claimed, “If your trip will be paid for by your relatives in the 
USA or any official American Organization, please contact Pan American, and we 
will assist you in making your arrangements for your trip through the General 
Agent of Aeroflot.”49
If the US-Soviet Civil Air Agreement’s provision allowing individuals to 
choose which airline to fly was honored,50 this pitch to Soviet citizens with rela-
tives in the US made good marketing sense. Nevertheless, the proposed ads de-
scribed above betrayed a certain wishful thinking, partly stemming from the 
very nature of advertising as a form of communication that elides potential ob-
stacles to create the aura of a seamless consumer experience. In the case of Pan 
Am, its brand was all about unimpeded movement across borders.51 Celebrating 
the détente that the new route signified, the New York Times (1968b) published 
on the first day of the inaugural flights a copy of the proposed JWT ad above 
(figure 2) with a brief story explaining to readers that it was running in Moscow 
newspapers and that Aeroflot was simultaneously running a full-page ad in the 
New York Times.52
The only problem is that this ad and similar Russian-language ads JWT pro-
duced for Pan Am in 1968 and 1969, to the best of my knowledge, were never 
actually published.53 A thorough search of Moskovskaia pravda and Vecherniaia 
Moskva for the months and years indicated on the copies of the ads cited above 
uncovered only one published Russian-language Pan Am ad produced by JWT 
(see figure 3).
In addition, a search in the Eastview database (dlib.eastview.com) similarly 
turned up no Pan Am ads for the late 1960s and 1970s in Soviet mass media. This 
search did reveal that Pan Am successfully placed Russian-language ads in Novoe 
russkoe slovo, a New York newspaper catering to the Russian émigré community in 
the US (see figure 4) (Novoe russkoe slovo 1968, 1970a, 1970b).
49 See the English-language draft and the Russian-language version of the finished ad in JWT 
Box PA76, folder 4. The quotations here are drawn from the English-language draft.
50 For this provision, see article 14, paragraph 3 of the agreement (“United States and USSR: 
Civil Air Transport Agreement,” 86).
51 On the centrality of this message for Pan Am’s business model and identity, see Van Vleck 
(2013).
52 For Aeroflot’s ad, see New York Times (1968c).
53 In addition to the two ads set to run in 1968 discussed above, JWT produced similar Rus-
sian-language ads for Pan Am in 1969, whose copies in the company’s archives included the same 
notation, “This advertisement appears in Moscow newspapers,” followed by a specific month of that 
year. See three such Russian-language ads (“V N’iu-Iork bez peresadok reaktivnymi samoletami 
‘Boing-707’ PAN AMERIKEN”; “V N’iu-Iork bez peresadok reaktivnymi samoletami Boing-707 PAN 
AMERIKEN”; “Teper’, dvazhdy v nedeliu, v N’iu-Iork bez peresadok reaktivnymi samoletami ‘Bo-
ing-707’ PAN AMERIKEN”) that were scheduled to run in January, March, and April 1969 in Moscow 
newspapers in JWT Box PA82, folder Pan Am 1969.
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Figure 3. “To New York without Transfer on the 
Boeing 707 Jets of Pan Am,” Vecherniaia 
Moskva, February 10, 1969
Figure 4. “Kogda-nibud’ … mozhet byt’ 
segodnia,” Novoe russkoe slovo (New York 
City), April 26, 1970
Such problems with advertising were corroborated by Pan Am executive George 
Hambleton (2011), who helped establish the route to Moscow, when he later recalled 
that their advertising amounted to calendars and what they put in Pan Am’s window 
at the Metropol Hotel. Interestingly, JWT had shared with Hambleton the ad that did 
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run in Vecherniaia Moskva (figure 3) and even film for television commercials, but ap-
parently neither left an impression on him when recalling his time in Moscow.54 
Meanwhile, JWT developed ads for the Soviet carrier, one of which ran in Foreign Af-
fairs magazine in October 1969 (“The Red Carpet Treatment”).55
Both airlines’ advertisements served symbolic functions that went far beyond 
selling seats on planes. Their positive representations of modern air travel across 
Cold War boundaries and the two airlines’ continued operation of their routes, I 
would argue, made it difficult for their governments to back out or suspend the Civil 
Air Agreement at will. The agreement alone did not bind the US and Soviet govern-
ments to the air routes. Also vital was the work that the two airlines, mass media, 
advertisers, and even pilots, flight attendants, and passengers put into building up 
the symbolic value of the shared routes. Although suspending the agreement was 
precisely what the American side ultimately did, it was a card the US government was 
unwilling to play when Pan Am soured on the route. The US government only did so 
when the route’s symbolic value that other actors had built up could be spent to 
score Cold War points, which was always of greater value to Washington than Pan 
Am’s bottom line.
“ give up nothing And tAke more”
At the macro level of international aviation, Pan Am was always far ahead of Aeroflot. 
The American carrier flew technologically superior aircraft, provided better customer 
service, and effectively maintained its brand through worldwide advertising. Its ex-
tensive routes and revenue far outpaced Aeroflot’s international presence.56 At the 
micro level of flights between the US and USSR, however, a different picture emerges. 
The most striking result was that Aeroflot flew more passengers and generated more 
revenue than Pan Am (see table 1). Like an upstart corporation taking on the estab-
lished competition, Aeroflot leveraged its advantages to dominate a small but sym-
bolically potent corner of a commercial market, thereby standing the dynamics of 
Cold War rivalry on their head right on the front lawn of American capitalism in New 
York City.
54 March 3, 1969, memo from Adele Finaly to George Hambleton in Moscow sharing the ad that 
actually ran in Vecherniaia Moskva and also copies of television commercials on 16 mm film; it was 
unclear where these TV ads were supposed to be shown. See this memo in JWT Box PA82, folder Pan 
Am 1969.
55 See the model for this ad in JWT Box PA80, folder Pan Am 1969 (3). See also the ad JWT 
developed for Aeroflot, “The Russians Are Going. (Tuesdays) The Russians Are Going. (Thursdays),” 
in JWT Competitive Ads, 1969 Box 39, folder 3.
56 For data allowing for comparison of both airlines’ revenues and profits (for Aeroflot, only its 
operations abroad), see the annual reports published by the International Civil Aviation Authority 
from 1972 to 1990 under the titles Financial Data / Renseignements financiers / Datos financieros / 
Финансовые данные and Financial Data: Commercial Air Carriers / Renseignements financiers: Trans-
porteurs aériens commerciaux / Datos financieros: Transportistas aéreos comerciales / Финансовые 
данные: Коммерческие авиатранспортные эксплуатанты.
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Table 1. Revenue and Passengers of Pan American and Aeroflot for US-USSR Services57
Year
Revenue58 Passengers
Amount, $ % Number %
1969
Pan American 1,657,000 43.6 6,392 43.9
Aeroflot 2,143,000 56.4 8,179 56.1
Total 3,800,000 14,571
1970
Pan American 1,900,000 41.2 7,531 41.6
Aeroflot 2,714,000 58.8 10,561 57.4
Total 4,614,000 18,092
1971
Pan American 1,654,000 36.7 6,926 37.6
Aeroflot 2,848,000 63.3 11,483 62.4
Total 4,502,000 18,409
1972
Pan American 1,932,000 30.8 9,382 33.2
Aeroflot 4,349,000 69.2 18,867 66.8
Total 6,281,000 28,249
1973
Pan American 2,498,000 33.3 8,521 32.0
Aeroflot 5,007,000 66.7 18,125 68.0
Total 7,505,000 26,646
1974
Pan American 2,911,000 29.3 8,157 27.8




Pan American 2,757,000 27.5 6,985 26.8
Aeroflot 7,272,000 72.5 19,084 73.2
Total 10,029,000 26,069
57 “A Discussion of Alternatives in US-USSR Aviation Relations,” December 1975 memorandum 
written by the Bureau of International Affairs, p. 4, Acc II, box 724, folder 8, PAWA Records. Pan Am 
was identified as the source for these data.
58 Footnote for the table in the original reads as follows: “1975, 1974 and 1973 revenue fig-
ures include cargo; 1972, 1971, 1970 and 1969 revenues do not. Cargo revenues amounted to about 
$400,000 each for Pan Am and Aeroflot for 1st 3 Qtrs. 1975.”
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Echoing Pan Am’s data above, reports that Aeroflot’s leadership in Moscow re-
ceived from its representatives in the US showed a lucrative operation steadily mak-
ing hard currency; always being on the lookout for expanding in the American mar-
ket, primarily through charter flights; stepping up advertising; contracting with US 
tourist agencies; and improving services by learning from other airlines.59 Far from 
celebrating US stagflation as a sign of capitalism’s imminent demise, as we might 
expect from Soviet propaganda, Aeroflot’s head of North American operations in the 
mid-1970s lamented behind closed doors its negative effects on ticket sales. The 
Soviet airline’s chief worries were stalled negotiations on adding more routes to 
America, Aeroflot’s poor customer service reputation, and suffering from anti-Soviet 
propaganda during US elections, which included the bombing of their Washington, 
DC, office.60 Throughout the 1970s, Aeroflot matured in the US into a corporation 
eager to capitalize on a promising market despite significant local and geopolitical 
obstacles.
Aeroflot’s strategy also rested on advantages stemming from the Soviet politi-
cal economy. According to the bilateral agreement between the two countries, Pan 
Am served as Aeroflot’s agent in the United States while Aeroflot served as Pan 
Am’s in the Soviet Union. Since the Soviets did not allow foreign airlines to sell 
airplane tickets within the USSR, this reciprocal arrangement ensured in theory 
that Pan Am could sell a sufficient number of tickets to Soviet citizens and foreign-
ers alike. As noted earlier, people in each country would be free to choose either 
Aeroflot or Pan Am for their journeys. In practice, Aeroflot frequently denied Soviet 
citizens and foreigners this choice inside the USSR, refused to sell them tickets on 
Pan Am flights, and urged them to fly Aeroflot instead. In the US the Soviet airline 
sold tickets to customers through travel agents, an option that Pan Am did not 
have in Moscow.61
By 1974 these discrepancies became so severe that Pan Am tried to sell tickets 
on its own in Moscow but was told to stop by the State Department so that the 
American side could retain “an unclouded legal and moral right” in resolving these 
problems.62 While retaining the high ground translated into vital currency for diplo-
mats, it failed to pay a corporation’s bills. Hamstrung by their own government, Pan 
59 RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 1814, “Reports from Aeroflot’s representatives abroad about their work 
in 1974,” ll. 31–68; RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 1889, “Stenogram of the meeting of Aeroflot representa-
tives working abroad, March 18–20, 1974, and related materials.”
60 RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 2050, “Reports of Aeroflot’s offices abroad about their work in 1975,” 
ll. 53–75; RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 2273, “Reports of Aeroflot’s offices abroad about their work in 1976,” 
ll. 151–184.
61 For a summary of the civil air agreement between the two countries, the agreement be-
tween the two airlines, and Pan Am’s account of problems implementing both, see “USSR (Aeroflot); 
Mr. Preece’s memorandum of July 23, 1974”; draft of Pan Am telegram to Nikolai Burov, August 12, 
1974; letter from Seth Preece to Michael Styles, March 22, 1974, Acc II, box 600, folder 18, PAWA 
Records.
62 Letter from Jack Matlock to Seth Preece, July 16, 1974, Acc II, box 600, folder 18, PAWA 
Records.
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Am executives grew increasingly frustrated while its Soviet partner ramped up its 
hardball tactics.
Wresting market share from a large but increasingly vulnerable competitor be-
holden to an unreliable government patron, the Soviet airline aggressively competed 
even if it meant damaging good relations with Pan Am. Aeroflot not only sought pas-
sengers flying to the USSR but also those flying to London and Paris or catching con-
nections at Shannon Airport in Ireland (see New York Times 1975a, 1977). Leveraging 
advantages rooted in the Soviet political economy, Aeroflot and Inturist surrepti-
tiously canceled the hotel reservations of passengers who flew on Pan Am in order to 
pressure US travel agents to only book tickets on Aeroflot and thereby magically 
avoid such mishaps.63 Soviet authorities undercut the American carrier’s operations 
in dangerous ways such as refusing to give its mechanics standby visas.64 Such tac-
tics contributed to Pan Am’s belief that “essentially, Aeroflot has viewed Pan Am as a 
competitor rather than as a partner in a cooperative venture”—a rather odd criticism 
coming from a capitalist corporation, but very much in the spirit of the 1966 Civil Air 
Agreement.65
To be sure, Pan Am lodged official complaints about Aeroflot’s underhanded 
moves and sought alongside the State Department to force Soviet compliance with 
the agreement, but with little effect.66 The “commercial principle” of Aeroflot, 
Samorukov later lamented, remained uncompromising: “Give up nothing and take 
more. We need hard currency” (2003:83, 88, 108–111). While the second part of this 
principle spoke to the peculiarities of the Soviet political economy, the first would 
have fit well as the motto of any self-respecting corporation seeking to dominate a 
market.
Chasing profits and earning hard currency were not the same thing, but they 
helped land Western airline corporations and the Soviet airline in the same legal 
predicament. In the 1970s Aeroflot joined other airlines by engaging in illegal re-
bating to travel agents and by selling tickets below prices set by American civil 
aviation authorities. Such tactics fell under the “unofficial discounts” Samorukov’s 
acquaintance at Inturist had urged him to learn. Ultimately, Aeroflot, Pan Am, and 
many other airlines faced criminal indictments in New York State court for illegally 
underselling airplane tickets outside the fixed price structure imposed by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (Lindsey 1974; New York Times 1975b; Bleiberg 1976:7). Before 
CAB issued Aeroflot with an official complaint, including a $1,000 fine per incident, 
the US State Department tried to prevent the diplomatic fallout by explaining to 
the Soviet ambassador that this was a “technical” matter, not a political one. Actu-
63 On such hotel cancelations, see the January 1977 memo “USSR Marketing Activities” from 
D. A. Colussy to Elihu Schott, Acc II, box 600, folder 18, PAWA Records.
64 Letter from Seth Preece to Michael Styles, March 22, 1974, p. 3, Acc II, box 600, folder 18, 
PAWA Records.
65 “USSR (Aeroflot); Mr. Preece’s memorandum of July 23, 1974,” p. 2, Acc II, box 600, folder 
18, PAWA Records. 
66 Pan Am internal memos from September 21, 1976, “USSR” and from November 22, 1976, 
“Visit of Aeroflot,” Acc II, box 600, folder 18, PAWA Records.
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ally, it was a legal matter that forced Aeroflot to appear in court as the “foreign 
corporation” it had become in the United States. The Soviet government was not 
amused, especially when its airline’s legal woes were reported in mass media. So-
viet diplomats vigorously complained and even accused Pan Am of orchestrating 
the affair.67
Aeroflot initially resisted a plea bargain with the US attorney for the Eastern 
District of New York that would have capped its fines at $25,000; Pan Am and most 
other airlines took the deal (New York Times 1975b). The Soviet carrier eventually 
paid US civil aviation authorities $40,000 in fines but not without first fighting the 
charges (Department of Transportation and Related Agencies 1975:765). Like other 
airline corporations, it hired a New York law firm and tried to have the underselling 
charges dismissed on two grounds. First, it argued that since the alleged sale of tick-
ets below rates established by CAB had taken place in Paris, it was outside the East-
ern District’s jurisdiction. Second, Aeroflot claimed that its residence was in Moscow, 
not in the Eastern District of New York, and so again beyond the court’s jurisdiction. 
The court found in Aeroflot’s favor for its first objection but rejected its second claim 
by meticulously describing all of Aeroflot’s operations and office space in New York 
City and at JFK airport (thereby leaving a short but welcome inventory for this histo-
rian). Moreover, Aeroflot’s lawyers did not object to having the Soviet airline fall into 
the category of a “foreign corporation.” On the contrary, they argued that the stat-
utes related to a litigant’s residence were “not intended to apply to corporations,” 
which was an indirect way of claiming that Aeroflot was itself a corporation, at least 
in the Eastern District of New York.68
Aeroflot’s illegal sales showed its American partner that it was willing to act 
like other airline corporations to aggressively capture market share. Its actions were 
also a small part of industry-wide pressures on the US government to deregulate 
airlines in 1978. The irony of a Soviet enterprise undermining fixed fares imposed by 
the US government appeared to have been lost on everyone at the time. But when 
Aeroflot blatantly advertised what it was doing, Pan Am executives were left won-
dering how they could ever compete with such an airline. In August 1975 a maga-
zine ad for Aeroflot titled “Worrying about tight travel budgets? Just remember who 
invented the planned economy” found its way to Pan Am offices. In trying to entice 
customers with cheap fares, amid the global oil crisis of the 1970s, the ad referenced 
67 On the use of “foreign corporation” to describe the nature of Aeroflot’s actions, see “Unit-
ed States of America v. General Department of International Air Services (Aeroflot Soviet Airlines)” 
(1979:17, 716–717, 727). On State Department communications dealing with Aeroflot’s legal woes, 
see Cable from US Secretary of State to US Embassy in Moscow, August 15, 1973, Document Number 
1973STATE161473, in Electric Telegrams in the Central Foreign Policy Files, US State Department, RG 
59. In the same collection, see also Cable from US Embassy in Moscow to US Secretary of State, June 
26, 1974, Document Number 1974MOSCOW10024; Cable from US Secretary of State to US Embassy in 
Moscow, July 13, 1974, Document Number 1974STATE151567; and Cable from the US Secretary of 
State to US Embassy in Moscow, July 29, 1974, Document Number 1974STATE164489.
68 “United States of America v. General Department of International Air Services (Aeroflot 
Soviet Airlines).”
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“rate-cutting” as one of many practices that made for “fiercely competitive days.” 
To explain how Aeroflot could provide cheap tickets and excellent service, the ad 
cheerfully noted, “One reason is we don’t have to make profits. And the other is that 
there’s one country that’s really expert in planning economical operations. Guess 
who that is.”69 Aeroflot’s goal of earning hard currency instead of profits set it apart 
from typical corporations. Yet its ability to translate its function in the Soviet po-
litical economy into an advertising pitch allowed it to compete successfully with 
other airlines.
When Pan Am ceased its scheduled flights to the USSR in 1978, it did so for 
economic reasons, which in its eyes resulted from deceitful Soviet practices.70 This 
was the same year that saw the deregulation of the US airline industry that un-
leashed market forces Pan Am was unable to adapt to, ultimately contributing to its 
collapse. The American carrier’s failure in the USSR was not a cause but rather a 
symptom of the airline’s broader inability to adjust to new circumstances and pri-
oritize its bottom line ahead of its obligations to the US government. Pan Am’s deci-
sion to halt regular flights to the USSR ended years of failed attempts on its part to 
operate profitably in a political economy with a nonconvertible currency that heav-
ily constrained the American corporation’s way of doing business. Although Pan Am 
continued to fly charter flights to the USSR at a profit,71 the end of its regular service 
confirmed what some executives had long feared: its obligations to the US govern-
ment had become little more than an economic burden, which it could no longer 
afford.
As for the US government, it sympathized with Pan Am’s position and tried to 
force its Soviet counterpart to keep Aeroflot in line. In 1974, for example, the direc-
tor of Soviet Affairs at the State Department, John Matlock, explained to Pan Am 
that the US Embassy in Moscow had “formally protested” Aeroflot’s transgressions 
regarding sales of Pan Am tickets.72 In response to such protests Aeroflot forcefully 
lobbied Pan Am to get the US government to lay off its stonewalling during nego-
tiations lest it damage both airline’s business.73 The US government ultimately could 
not force the Soviet government and Aeroflot to adhere to the two countries’ Civil 
Air Agreement, which itself is a testimony to the limits of American power during 
the Cold War.
69 The ad originally appeared in a Thai tourist magazine that sold in New York. “Aeroflot Ad-
vertising,” memo dated August 21, 1975; “Worrying about tight travel budgets? Just remember who 
invented the planned economy,” photocopy of Aeroflot’s magazine advertisement, Acc II, box 600, 
folder 18, PAWA Records.
70 “Suspension of Pan Am Service to Moscow,” memo from N. P. Seagrave, July 10, 1979, pp. 
1–3, Acc II, box 754, folder 16, PAWA Records.
71 On Pan Am’s operation of charter flights after suspending scheduled flights, see “Suspen-
sion of Pan Am Service to Moscow,” p. 2.
72 Letter from Jack Matlock to Seth Preece, July 16, 1974, Acc II, box 600, folder 18, PAWA 
Records.
73 Letter from E. P. Barabash to F. Wiser, July 15, 1976, Acc II, box 600, folder 18, PAWA 
Records.
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At the level of high politics and diplomacy, Svik argues, the chronic problems 
plaguing the air routes between the US and USSR already signaled by 1974 that “avi-
ation détente was over” (2020:215–216). Yet Aeroflot, Pan Am, and certain non-state 
actors, I would argue, continued to play a critical role in shaping this corner of the 
Cold War, helping to extend détente beyond what the American government was will-
ing to tolerate. Aeroflot and Pan Am’s shared route opened a space for mass media 
publications and advertisers to promote it as a sign of détente, providing visual and 
textual representations that humanized the Cold War adversaries and presented an 
alternative reality of cooperation and normalcy in the face of an always-imminent 
nuclear catastrophe.
While the Soviet and American governments penned a dry civil air agreement, it 
was left to the airlines, their advertisers, and mass media to shape for the public in 
the US and USSR what this air bridge was supposed to mean. By the time Pan Am’s 
problems became starkly clear in 1974, the US government did not and, I would argue, 
could not definitively retaliate by shutting down Aeroflot’s regular flights, at least 
not yet. The symbolic value of the air routes joining the superpowers—a value bol-
stered by the airlines and non-state actors in advertising and mass media—was sim-
ply too high to squander on Pan Am’s complaints alone. The symbolism of the routes 
constrained what the US government could legitimately do. Opportunities to spend 
the routes’ symbolic capital would come soon enough.
In the meantime, Aeroflot maintained its aggressive push into the American 
market for as long as geopolitics would allow. Nevertheless, it faced its share of dif-
ficult conditions in the US, like “high prices,” “inflation,” as well as “anti-Soviet pro-
paganda” and “the provocative actions of Zionist groups,” but typically found ways 
to overcome or simply ignore them like any corporation facing a turbulent market, 
government regulators, and hostile protestors.74 Some issues, Aeroflot representa-
tives admitted, were of their own making, such as complaints from passengers who 
had bought first class seats on flights where no such section existed. And they rec-
ognized that some business in the American market was lost for purely economic 
reasons, such as a recent 8 percent rise in transatlantic fares coupled with a 25 per-
cent drop in domestic fares. But anti-Soviet politics, Aeroflot representatives report-
ed to headquarters, were also damaging. The 1976 election season unleashed a wave 
of anti-Soviet invective from both political parties, as well as “Zionists, the staunch-
est apologists of the military-industrial complex, defenders of the position of 
‘strength,’ and various hardcore renegades feeding the fierce hatred of everything 
Soviet.” Aeroflot reported, in a rather rich accusation, that the Ford administration 
pressured tourist agencies to book Americans on American carriers and launched a 
campaign calling for “‘balanced’ economic profits and business relations with the 
Soviet Union and socialist countries.” To make matters worse, anti-Soviet sentiment 
74 “Report from the General Representative of Aeroflot in the US on its work in 1975,” RGAE, f. 
55, op. 1, d. 2050, ll. 16–17.
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in the United States—including “spymania” and “the gall of hooligan elements [act-
ing] against Soviet organizations”—spilled over into Canada and Mexico.75
Despite all these economic and political problems, Aeroflot’s New York and Wash-
ington offices continued to report to headquarters in Moscow their consistent growth 
and fulfillment of annual plans, particularly in hard currency earnings. Aeroflot’s re-
ports confirmed Pan Am’s own assessment of the Soviet airline’s financial success, 
absent the American carrier’s charge that it had come at Pan Am’s expense.76 Its 
representatives abroad and top brass in Moscow stressed the need to expand and 
improve service, particularly in the American market. Their recommendations includ-
ed extending Aeroflot service into southern states like Florida and Texas, using mar-
ket research and growing its advertising, learning from the example of well-estab-
lished airlines how it could improve its services, introducing business class on the 
New York–Moscow route, figuring out the implications of airline deregulation in the 
US, competing for individual passengers and offering discounts, advertising to at-
tract transit passengers going through Moscow, seeking out other American partners 
to squeeze out Pan Am, and improving customer service.77
Aeroflot kept flying to the United States until geopolitics finally intervened 
when the Carter administration halted its flights to New York in 1980 in retaliation 
for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and when the Reagan administration ended 
Aeroflot flights to Washington the following year over the Soviet suppression of Sol-
idarity in Poland. The US government finally found sufficient cause to deprive the 
Soviet Union and its airline of the business they craved, as well as the symbolism of 
détente that Pan Am and Aeroflot, their advertisers, and mass media had built up. The 
two airlines resumed their shared routes in the renewed thaw of 1986 (Gold 1987). A 
75 “Report on the productive and financial activities of the General Representative of Aeroflot 
in the US in 1976,” RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 2273, ll. 168, 183; “Report on the work of the Regional 
Representative of Aeroflot in the countries of North American in 1976,” RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 2273, 
ll. 208–209, 218–219. For similar claims by Aeroflot that its business in the US was hurt because of 
American economic problems and anti-Soviet political efforts, see “Report on the productive and 
financial activities of the representative of Aeroflot in Washington in 1979,” RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 
3036, ll. 86–88.
76 See, e.g., Aeroflot’s data on its economic performance in the United States in “Report on 
the productive and financial activities of the General Representative of Aeroflot in New York in 
1974,” RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 1814, ll. 33–34; “Report on the productive and financial activities of the 
General Representative of Aeroflot in the US in 1975,” RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 2050, ll. 4–6; “Report on 
the productive and financial activities of the representative of Aeroflot in Washington in 1979,” 
RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 3036, ll. 89–90; and “Report on the work of the representative of Aeroflot in 
New York in 1979,” RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 3036, ll. 118–119.
77 For such recommendations, see the stenographic report from a March 1974 meeting of 
Aeroflot representatives working abroad in RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 1889, ll. 70–94, 103–113, 325–335, 
383–391; “Report on the work of the Regional Representative of Aeroflot in US, Canada, and Mexico 
in 1975,” RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 2050, ll. 68–70, 73–75; “Report on the work of the representative of 
Aeroflot in Washington in 1975,” RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, d. 2050, ll. 189, 198; “Report on the productive 
and financial activities of the representative of Aeroflot in Washington in 1979,” RGAE, f. 55, op. 1, 
d. 3036, ll. 93–96; “Report on the work of the representative of Aeroflot in New York in 1979,” RGAE, 
f. 55, op. 1, d. 3036, ll. 120–121, 142–145. 
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few years later in 1991, however, their partnership fell apart again, but not as we 
might expect. It was Pan Am that collapsed in December of that year, along with the 
Soviet empire, while a drastically downsized Aeroflot emerged from the Soviet rubble 
to become a viable international airline. And a corporation.
ConClusion
To the many functions that we attribute to Aeroflot in the Soviet era, we must now 
also include the one of airline corporation. By operating in the West and in the US in 
particular, Aeroflot learned how to become an airline corporation to fulfill political 
and economic goals such as building the USSR’s global prestige, symbolically repre-
senting its parity with the US, and earning hard currency for Soviet coffers. The air-
line’s managers, I argue, also adopted corporate practices for other reasons such as 
growing the company’s brand, competing with their erstwhile partner, defending the 
airline in court, and simply functioning on a day-to-day basis in the US market and 
New York City. Aeroflot was indeed an “operation,” as critics feared during the Cold 
War, but a significant part of that operation, as this article has shown, included the 
practices and behaviors of corporations.
Pan Am’s demise alongside the USSR, on the one hand, and Aeroflot’s reinvention 
in the 1990s, on the other, show in dramatic fashion how corporations and the “his-
tory from the middle” that they constituted can help us rethink the end of the Cold 
War. For corporations like Pan Am, the late 1980s and early 1990s were particularly 
unkind and resulted in their collapse. Bockman’s provocative thesis about the “left-
wing” origins of neoliberalism suggests that Pan Am’s collapse and Aeroflot’s mas-
sive restructuring owed something to the longer transnational exchange of econom-
ic theories well below the surface of Cold War politics. We tend to see the dramatic 
economic restructuring of the late 1980s and early 1990s as a fate that befell state 
socialist enterprises since this fits the triumphalist narrative of the Cold War’s end. 
Yet, Pan Am’s ironic demise in the same month as the USSR’s collapse suggests that 
broader economic transformations on both sides of the Iron Curtain may have shared 
common roots.
The American carrier’s privileged status as the US government’s “chosen instru-
ment” and the CAB’s heavy regulation of the airline industry were the kind of low-
hanging fruit neoliberal ideologues were eager to annihilate (Trost 2014). One could 
argue that the deregulation of US airline corporations and the disruptions it caused 
for legacy carriers like Pan Am were but a taste of the neoliberal “shock therapy” 
state socialist regimes would experience a decade later. In this view, the turbulence 
of the late 1980s came not only from the high politics of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s resolution of the Cold War but also from the economic forces and ideas—
unleashed around the time that Aeroflot and Pan Am were settling into their Mos-
cow–New York route—that came to a head in 1991.78
78 For example, the economic impact of OPEC’s oil embargo in 1973 and the effects it had on 
Western and state socialist economies have long been considered factors in the USSR’s collapse 
(see, e.g., Kotkin 2001).
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ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ56
Я благодарю двух анонимных рецензентов, Дугласа Роджерса, а также участ-
ников конференции «Российская корпорация/Корпорация в России» (Йель-
ский университет, февраль 2019 г.) за их критическое прочтение этой ста-
тьи. Я признателен Лие Тамс за ее комментарии и за неоценимую помощь в 
работе с коллекцией Дж. Уолтера Томпсона в Университете Дьюка, матери-
алы из которой использованы в этой статье. Кроме того, хочу выразить 
благодарность Уильяму Бернсу за его советы по концептуализации «Аэроф-
лота» как корпорации, а также участникам нескольких семинаров и конфе-
ренций за их критику более ранних версий этой статьи, представленных в 
Университете Пенсильвании, Амстердамском университете, Университете 
Шеффилда и на ежегодной встрече Общества истории технологий. Иссле-
дование и написание этого текста стали возможными благодаря финанси-
рованию Национального музея авиации и космонавтики в Вашингтоне и Уни-
верситета Мэри Вашингтон. 
Подобно сексу, корпораций в Советском Союзе не существовало. Знаменитое выска-
зывание эпохи Горбачева о бесполом советском существовании подсказывает, как 
мы можем подойти к тому, что случилось с корпорацией в советской истории. На-
равне с сексом в советской культуре, государство рабочих формально искоренило 
устрашающие инкорпорированные тела капитализма и не пощадило их в последую-
щих идеологических битвах. Но, как и в случае с сексом, корпоративные манеры и 
практики возникали в самых необычных местах, чтобы поддержать советскую эко-
номику, в то время как Запад оставался источником вдохновения для новых спосо-
бов сделать это. Чтобы изучить корпорации советского времени, в этой статье ис-
следуется «Аэрофлот» и маршруты, которые он разделял с Pan American World 
Airways (Pan Am) между США и СССР в конце 1960-х и 1970-х годах. Я утверждаю, что 
работа на рынке США позволила «Аэрофлоту» научиться быть корпорацией задолго 
до эпохи Горбачева и распада Советского Союза. Адаптация «Аэрофлотом» корпора-
тивной практики скорее укрепила авиакомпанию и советскую политическую эконо-
мию, чем угрожала им. Кроме того, я показываю, как авиакомпания полагалась не 
только на Pan Am, но и на сеть американских предприятий и частных лиц (в том чи-
сле эмигрантов из России), чтобы приучить себя к корпоративной практике. Я ут-
верждаю, что пример «Аэрофлота» предполагает, что советские предприятия могли 
стать корпорациями во всем, кроме названия, за пределами советских границ и что 
их моделями для этого были не дореволюционные российские корпорации, а запад-
ные корпорации послевоенной эпохи. В этой статье также показано, каким образом 
корпорации и государственные социалистические предприятия влияли на облик 
Холодной войны, и что более пристальное внимание к ним может раскрыть в отно-
шении того, как закончился конфликт сверхдержав.
Ключевые слова: «Аэрофлот»; Pan American World Airways; Холодная война; граждан-
ская авиация; реклама; корпорация
